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THE “OTHER” LAW OF THE SEA
Commander Andrew J. Norris, U.S. Coast Guard
The 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) is, quite un-derstandably, viewed by many as the “be all, end all” statement and source of
the law of the sea. Not only does the convention’s name imply that it occupies the
field, so to speak, but its sheer size, scope, ubiquity, and near-universal accep-
tance support such a perception. Even the United States, which has not ratified
UNCLOS, considers most of its provisions to reflect, or to have achieved the sta-
tus of, customary international law and thus to be binding on nations that do
not specifically decline to adhere to them.
The reality, however, is that while UNCLOS provides an overall framework
for legal governance of the world’s oceans and codifies such important princi-
ples as freedom of the high seas and flag-state primacy, it is by no means the sin-
gle, definitive statement of the law of the sea. Other significant international
conventions are widely accepted and fill some gaps in the UNCLOS framework.
Importantly, many of these “other” sources of the law of the sea provide coastal
and port states like the United States substantial
power and authority to safeguard vital safety, security,
and environmental interests within their maritime
zones, including the exclusive economic zone, contig-
uous zone, territorial sea, and internal waters. The
United States has ratified many of these conventions
and incorporated their provisions into domestic law.
This article will discuss and analyze aspects of this
supporting array of international maritime law. It will
begin by examining UNCLOS to set out its basic
framework for governance of the world’s oceans. It
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will next discuss the particulars of less widely discussed sources of the law of the
sea in the vessel safety, security, and pollution realms, and demonstrate how they
add “fabric,” greater fidelity, to UNCLOS’s general framework. The article will
then discuss specifics of the American port-state control program—the means
by which the United States, as a coastal/port state, utilizes control measures
made available to it by these “other” sources of the law of the sea to ensure that
visiting foreign vessels adhere to minimal international standards. Finally,
through an analysis of U.S. port-state control program statistics and recent do-
mestic case law, the article will assess the effectiveness of the legal regime pre-
scribed by this “other” law of the sea.
UNCLOS
UNCLOS is, in many respects, an amazing treaty. Hailed as “possibly the most
significant legal instrument of [the twentieth] century,” UNCLOS strikes a deli-
cate balance between freedom of navigation and utilization of the oceans on the
one hand, and on the other, sovereign rights and control over the ocean and its
resources.1 It solves long-standing issues that had proved to be intractable (e.g.,
the allowable breadth of the territorial sea) and creates new legal regimes to re-
flect evolving state practice (such as the exclusive economic zone). Against a
backdrop of overweening national self-interest, it achieves a remarkable degree
of consensus and compromise in areas that significantly impact national sover-
eignty and sovereign rights, particularly over resources—matters that have his-
torically caused nations to go to, or threaten, war.2
The first major thing UNCLOS does is establish the limits of various mari-
time zones and delineate who can do what in each zone, in the airspace above
them, and with respect to the resources of the water column, the seabed, and the
subsoil within each zone.3 UNCLOS permits a coastal state to declare a territo-
rial sea that extends up to twelve nautical miles from its baseline;4 it further per-
mits claims to, and exercise of, sovereignty over all waters shoreward of the
twelve-nautical-mile line.5 These waters, comprising the territorial sea and a
state’s internal waters (the latter term referring to all waters landward of the
baseline), are collectively known as “territorial waters.” The rest of the world’s
waters are known as “international waters” and are divided into three zones:6 a
“contiguous zone,” which can extend from the outer edge of a nation’s territorial
sea up to twenty-four nautical miles from its baseline;7 an “exclusive economic
zone” (EEZ), which can extend from the outer edge of a nation’s territorial sea
up to two hundred nautical miles from its baseline;8 and the high seas, which are
all waters seaward of declared EEZs.9 International waters are not “owned” by
any nation, though, as we shall see, UNCLOS does permit nations to exercise
limited sovereign rights in international waters.
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Second, UNCLOS codifies the doctrine of flag-state primacy. A “flag state” is
a nation that confers its nationality upon ships and grants such ships the right to
fly its flag. A ship has the nationality of the state whose flag it is entitled to fly; it
does not necessarily have the nationality of, for example, its owner or operator
(individual or corporate), crew, etc., unless any of the latter happen to be of the
same nationality as the flag state.10 Thus, a ship that is owned by an American cor-
poration, operated by a Greek shipping company, crewed by a mixed-nationality
crew, and flagged in Panama is a Panamanian vessel. It is critically important for
vessels, especially those involved in legitimate international trade, to be flagged
by some nation. The alternative, not to be flagged by any nation, is to be without
nationality, stateless. Vessels without nationality are “international pariahs,”
without an internationally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas
and subject to the exercise of jurisdiction and control by all nations.11 Clearly,
the benefits to owners and operators of having flag states—ensuring their vessels
can navigate freely, without being impeded by officials of non-flag-state nations
except in tightly limited circumstances—outweigh the burdens and costs of
flagging their vessels in particular nations.
But there are burdens and costs that come with permission to fly a nation’s
flag—paramount among them subjection to the law-enforcement and regula-
tory jurisdiction of the flag state. The term “jurisdiction” includes the right to
prescribe laws and regulations that are to apply aboard a particular vessel (that
is, “jurisdiction to prescribe”), the right to enforce those laws and regulations in
civil or criminal tribunals (“jurisdiction to enforce and adjudicate”), and an im-
plied right to “interfere” with the vessel to the extent necessary to exercise that
jurisdiction.12 Not only do vessels flagged by a nation become subject to its crim-
inal laws, but UNCLOS specifically grants flag states the authority and responsi-
bility to assert regulatory control over their vessels as well. This control includes
the right and obligation to take regulatory measures designed to ensure safety at
sea with regard to, inter alia, the construction, equipment, and seaworthiness of
vessels; the crewing of vessels; and the ability of vessels to communicate effec-
tively to avoid collisions.13 Examples of such measures include periodic survey-
ing of vessels and ensuring that adequate charts and navigational devices are
carried; that crews are of appropriate size, certification, and training; and that
crews observe “applicable international regulations” concerning safety and envi-
ronmental stewardship.14 In short, the flag state assumes, and owners/operators
accede to, full responsibility for, and jurisdiction over, vessels that fly its flag.15
Having introduced UNCLOS’s maritime zones and the notion of flag-state pri-
macy, we can now turn to the regime’s most important function—prescribing
(in the absence of superseding agreements to the contrary) who can do what,
where, on and in the world’s oceans.16 There are four classes of nation-states under
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the UNCLOS scheme that have interests and equities in activities in and on the
oceans: flag states, port states, coastal states, and third-party states. The extent of
a nation’s interests and equities will vary, depending on which of the four classes
it falls into, the maritime zone at issue, the activities occurring within that zone,
and the nationality of the vessel engaging in them. Two equities are of particular
significance: first, the right to exercise authority, jurisdiction, and control over
vessels;17 and second, the right to control the utilization of resources, whether
living or nonliving.
To start with the high seas—vessels of all nations enjoy “freedom of the high
seas,” which includes, among other things, freedom of navigation and of fish-
ing.18 Though not specifically enumerated in UNCLOS, freedom of navigation
includes a freedom from interference—that is, the right of a vessel flagged by
one state to proceed unmolested by officials from another state.19 This idea is
codified in UNCLOS article 92, which states that on the high seas, flag states
have, with limited exceptions, exclusive jurisdiction over vessels that fly their
flags.20 In practical terms, this means—again, with limited exceptions—that
only flag-state officials may interfere with the free navigation of their flagged
vessels (by stopping and boarding them, for example) and take law-enforcement
action as warranted (including arrest and seizure, with a view toward prosecu-
tion) aboard them on the high seas.
When a vessel flagged by one state leaves the high seas and enters the mari-
time zones of a coastal/port state, however, the flag state’s jurisdiction over that
vessel, though it still exists in full force, is no longer exclusive. The coastal/port
state gains concurrent jurisdictional rights over that vessel, rights that increase
as the vessel gets closer to land.21 For example (moving shoreward from the high
seas), UNCLOS grants coastal states “sovereign rights” in their EEZ to “explore,
exploit, conserve, and manage” the resources, both living and nonliving, both
within the water column and on and below the seabed.22 Included within the
concept of sovereign rights is the right of the coastal state to exercise jurisdiction
so as to prevent and punish infractions by vessels, wherever flagged, of its resource-
related laws.23 Thus, a foreign vessel suspected of fishing in a coastal state’s EEZ
in violation of that state’s resource laws can be boarded and searched by officials
of the coastal state; further, it can be subjected to seizure and enforcement action
in tribunals of the coastal state if a violation is confirmed. These coastal-state
resource-related jurisdictional rights exist concurrently with flag-state rights;
in other words, the flag state could choose to prohibit resource-related infrac-
tions by its vessels in foreign EEZs and could punish such violations in its own
tribunals, in addition to whatever enforcement actions the coastal state takes.
The flag state retains exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels for any nonresource
infractions committed by or on board its vessels while in another nation’s EEZ.24
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The EEZ jurisdictional regime discussed above is wholly applicable within
the contiguous zone as well, as that zone is entirely contained within the EEZ. In
addition, UNCLOS empowers a coastal state in its contiguous zone to “exercise
the control necessary” to prevent or, in the case of a vessel departing its territo-
rial waters, punish violations of its fiscal, immigration, sanitary, or customs
(known as FISC) laws.25 Thus, for example, the coastal state could exercise juris-
diction as necessary, including enforcement action in its tribunals, against a for-
eign vessel that was intercepted in the contiguous zone while attempting to
smuggle prohibited items from the coastal state (a customs violation). Again,
these coastal-state jurisdictional rights in its contiguous zone are exercised con-
currently with those of the flag state, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over its
vessels in all other respects (i.e., for all nonresource, non-FISC violations) while
its vessels are in foreign contiguous zones.
A coastal state’s jurisdictional rights over a foreign vessel increase signifi-
cantly once the vessel crosses from international waters into that state’s territo-
rial waters (that is, as defined above, its territorial sea and internal waters).
UNCLOS provides a coastal state broad authority in its territorial sea to pre-
scribe laws that apply to all vessels, including foreign vessels. Examples of what
the coastal state has the right to prescribe are its criminal, fiscal, immigration,
sanitary, customs, pollution, and navigational-safety laws and regulations.26
There are only two explicit limitations in UNCLOS on the coastal state’s juris-
diction to prescribe. First, it may not prescribe laws relating to foreign vessel de-
sign, construction, manning, or equipment, unless they merely implement
international regulations; as we have seen, and pursuant to UNCLOS article 94,
such matters are the province of the flag state.27 Second, it may not prescribe laws
so burdensome that they have the practical effect of preventing vessels from ex-
ercising a fundamental navigational right in foreign territorial seas—that is, the
right of innocent passage.28
UNCLOS defines “innocent passage” as a foreign vessel’s right to pass, in a
continuous and expeditious manner, through a coastal state’s territorial sea as
long as during the passage the vessel engages in no act that prejudices the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal state.29 The significance here of the right of
innocent passage is that a coastal state’s enforcement jurisdiction—whether
criminal or civil—over a foreign vessel that is legitimately in innocent passage is
limited to a certain degree. First of all, a vessel driven into territorial waters due
to distress or entering them to assist another vessel or aircraft is generally exempt
from coastal-state enforcement of its domestic laws that would otherwise have
governed that vessel’s entry.30 Second, the coastal state generally is prohibited
from arresting anyone aboard a vessel in innocent passage or from taking any
steps, including conducting a criminal investigation aboard the vessel, in
NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:55 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
5
Norris: The “Other” Law of the Sea
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
response to a criminal act that may have occurred before the vessel entered the
territorial sea.31 Finally, with respect to a violation occurring aboard a foreign
vessel during its innocent passage, if the vessel has no intention of calling at one
of its roadsteads or ports, the coastal state should not exercise its enforcement
jurisdiction over that vessel except in very limited circumstances: if the conse-
quences of the violation extend to the coastal state; if the violation is of a kind to
disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; if the
master of the ship or a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state has
requested the assistance of local authorities; or if enforcement proceedings are
necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances.32 It is important to note that this limitation in coastal-state enforce-
ment jurisdiction with respect to a violation occurring aboard a foreign vessel
during its innocent passage is “hortatory” only (“should not exercise its enforce-
ment jurisdiction”)—that is, not mandatory under international law but a dis-
cretionary exercise of coastal-state comity.
A foreign vessel that is in a coastal state’s territorial sea but not in innocent
passage is subject to the full legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of the
coastal state;33 after all, it is in the state’s sovereign waters. Similarly, a port state
has full sovereignty over its internal waters and has plenary jurisdiction over for-
eign vessels while they are there (there is no right of innocent passage in internal
waters).34 The port state retains plenary jurisdiction over a foreign vessel passing
through its territorial sea after a call at one of the coastal state’s ports for offenses
committed there.35 With respect to a vessel transiting through its territorial sea
on the way to its internal waters, the port state has the right to take the necessary
steps—including denial of entry—while the vessel is still in the territorial sea to
prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission to internal waters is
subject.36
Although under the UNCLOS framework a coastal/port state exercises in-
creasing jurisdiction over a foreign vessel as the vessel approaches that
state—particularly when the vessel intends to call on the state—UNCLOS is de-
liberately devoid of specifics in many areas. For example, while, as discussed
above, UNCLOS permits a coastal state to adopt pollution laws and regulations
applicable to foreign vessels in its territorial sea, the regime provides no guid-
ance as to the nature and scope of such laws and regulations, other than that they
must be “in conformity with the provisions of [UNCLOS] and other rules of in-
ternational law.”37 Also, again as discussed above, under UNCLOS the flag state
is principally responsible for vessel design, construction, manning, and equip-
ment; coastal/port states may not apply their laws to foreign vessels in this realm,
“unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or stan-
dards.”38 But UNCLOS provides no guidance as to what such “generally accepted”
N O R R I S 8 3
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standards are, nor does it purport to set or adopt any. As the following section
will show, UNCLOS does not need to do so; these standards are set by other
widely accepted multilateral maritime treaties—the “other” law of the sea.
THE “FABRIC” OF THE UNCLOS FRAMEWORK
UNCLOS relies for these purposes on dozens of such conventions, but this arti-
cle will focus on five that are particularly significant and wide-ranging: the In-
ternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (the SOLAS Convention);
the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pol-
lution Prevention (ISM Code); the International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention);
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL Convention); and the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code (ISPS Code).
Before turning to the specifics, however, a few background topics need to be
discussed. The first of these is the “organization that has probably had the most
substantial direct effect on the law of the sea”—the International Maritime Or-
ganization.39 The IMO is the “United Nations’ specialized agency with responsi-
bility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine
pollution by ships.”40 The convention establishing the IMO was adopted in 1948
and came into effect in 1958; the IMO’s first meeting was held in 1959. Most of
its work is done in committees, including the Maritime Safety Committee, the
Marine Environment Protection Committee, and the Legal Committee. These
bodies identify needs for new conventions or for amendments to existing ones.
All of the important conventions to be discussed in this section were adopted
under the auspices of the IMO, which today oversees the process of keeping
these conventions abreast of developments in maritime and related industries.
The second preliminary point is the role of nongovernmental entities in help-
ing flag states carry out their responsibilities. These entities fall into two catego-
ries: “recognized organizations” (in this context, classification societies) and
“recognized security organizations” (RSOs). A classification society is an orga-
nization that “establish[es] and appl[ies] technical standards in relation to the
design, construction and survey of marine related facilities including ships and
offshore structures.”41 An RSO is an entity that an ISPS signatory state may au-
thorize to undertake certain security-related activities on its behalf, including
approval of Ship Security Plans or amendments thereto; verification and certifi-
cation of ships’ compliance with ISPS requirements; and conduct of Port Facil-
ity Security Assessments.42 The significance of these nongovernmental entities,
of both kinds, is that the extent to which any given foreign vessel is likely to be se-
lected for safety or security examination depends on the demonstrated,
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historical performance not only of its flag state but also of the nongovernmental
entity to which those responsibilities have been “subcontracted.”
Finally, the “other” law of the sea, like UNCLOS, consists of treaties that are
notionally binding only on signatory states. Thus, theoretically, nonsignatory
nations do not have to comply with their standards, and coastal/port states can-
not formally utilize the specific provisions of these treaties when taking, or an-
ticipating the need to take, control actions aboard vessels of nonsignatory states.
But the reality is that the vast majority of nations in general, and flag states in
particular, have adopted them. A very few vessels flagged by nonsignatory states
do engage in international trade; it can certainly be argued, however, that many
of the provisions of the supplementary instruments are so widely adhered to
that they have acquired the status of customary international law, binding for
those states too, if they have not expressly “opted out.” This argument, coupled
with UNCLOS’s grant of authority to port/coastal states to ensure foreign vessel
adherence to “other rules of international law” and “generally accepted interna-
tional rules or standards,” gives such states significant clout over vessels flagged
by states that have not specifically adopted those rules and standards.43
The SOLAS Convention. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974, as amended, prescribes minimum standards for the construction,
equipment, and operation of ships. The genesis for the convention was the disas-
trous RMS Titanic sinking in 1912, which led to the first iteration of SOLAS in
1914. Since then it has been comprehensively revised several times.44 The most
recent version, that of 1974, entered into force on 25 May 1980; it has been
adopted by 159 nations, including the United States, which collectively represent
99.04 percent of world shipping tonnage.45 According to the IMO, “the SOLAS
Convention in its successive forms is generally regarded as the most important
of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships.”46
The real substance of SOLAS is in the annex, which is divided into twelve
chapters, as follows: chapter I, “General Provisions”; chapter II-1, “Construction
Subdivision and Stability, Machinery and Electrical Installations”; chapter II-2,
“Fire Protection, Fire Detection, and Fire Extinction”; chapter III, “Life-Saving
Appliances and Arrangements”; chapter IV, “Radiocommunications”; chapter
V, “Safety of Navigation”; chapter VI, “Carriage of Cargoes”; chapter VII, “Car-
riage of Dangerous Goods”; chapter VIII, “Nuclear Ships”; chapter IX, “Man-
agement for the Safe Operation of Ships”; chapter X, “Safety Measures for
High-Speed Craft”; chapter XI-1, “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime
Safety”; chapter XI-2, “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security”; and
chapter XII, “Additional Safety Measures for Bulk Carriers.”
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Within each chapter are detailed standards that establish minimum perfor-
mance benchmarks in each area. Flags states are responsible for their vessels’
compliance with these standards and for certifying compliance; examples in-
clude the Safety Construction Certificate, Safety Equipment Certificate, Safety
Radio Certificate, and Passenger Ship Safety Certificate. The convention permits
port states to inspect such certificates aboard foreign vessels and to conduct fur-
ther examinations, and possibly take control measures, if onboard conditions
clearly do not comport with the certificates.
The ISM Code. The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention was adopted in 1993 in response to human
errors or omissions that had apparently played causal roles in significant marine
casualties during the 1980s.47 In 2002, IMO Resolution MSC.99(73) created a
new chapter IX (“Management for the Safe Operation of Ships”) in SOLAS in-
corporating the ISM Code into that convention; as a result, all SOLAS signatory
nations are also now bound by the code. To accomplish its goal of promoting
safety and environmental protection through the minimization of human error,
the ISM Code requires shipowners and other persons, such as managers or
bareboat charterers, who assume responsibility for operating the ship (we will
refer to them below, generically, as “the company”) to implement Safety Man-
agement Systems.48 These systems (mostly in the form of checklists) must be
documented and maintained in a Safety Management Manual to be kept on
board the vessel.
A Safety Management System should contain the following functional
elements:
• A safety and environmental-protection policy
• Instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protec-
tion of the environment in compliance with relevant international and
flag-state legislation
• Defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and
among, shore and shipboard personnel
• Procedures for reporting accidents and nonconformities with the provi-
sions of the code
• Procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations
• Procedures for internal audits and management reviews.49
Examples of instructions and checklists required in the Safety Management
Manual are those that define various tasks and assign qualified personnel to
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carry out key shipboard operations that impact the safety of the ship and the
prevention of pollution; that establish procedures to identify, describe, and re-
spond to potential emergency shipboard situations and establish a program for
drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions; and that establish proce-
dures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of
relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements that may be
established by the company.
Flag states are primarily responsible for ensuring their vessels’ compliance
with the ISM Code, since it is part of SOLAS. A signatory flag state attests to a
company’s compliance with ISM by issuing certificates, which include a Docu-
ment of Compliance, issued to the operating company upon verification that it
meets ISM requirements, and a Safety Management Certificate, issued to a com-
pany’s vessels to attest their compliance with these same requirements. Again, as
with SOLAS, port states are permitted to inspect such certificates, conduct fur-
ther examinations, and take control measures aboard foreign vessels as war-
ranted if a vessel clearly does not meet the minimum standards that the
certificates are supposed to ensure.
The STCW Convention. Having safety, maintenance, and equipment operation
checklists in a Safety Management System is one thing; having qualified, profi-
cient mariners to carry out important shipboard functions is quite another. The
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-
keeping for Seafarers, which was adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force
on 28 April 1984, was devised to prescribe uniform international minimum
standards for the training and certification of, and watch keeping by, mariners.
One hundred fifty-four nations, which collectively flag 99.15 percent of global
shipping tonnage, have adopted the convention.50
The STCW Convention comprises chapter I, “General Provisions”; chapter II,
“Master and Deck Department”; chapter III, “Engine Department”; chapter IV,
“Radiocommunication and Radio Personnel”; chapter V, “Special Training Re-
quirements for Personnel on Certain Types of Ships”; chapter VI, “Emergency,
Occupational Safety, Medical Care and Survival Functions”; chapter VII, “Alter-
native Certification”; and chapter VIII, “Watchkeeping.” The basic requirements
of the convention are enlarged upon by the STCW Code, created as part of
amendments to the convention in 1995. The convention’s chapters and the code
provide specific training, experience, and other requirements that a mariner
must possess in order to be certified to serve in a particular capacity aboard a
vessel.
Unlike with most other IMO-sponsored international agreements, the main
onus for compliance with STCW rests not with the flag state but instead with the
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country (“administration”) certifying a particular mariner as being trained and
competent in accordance with international standards.51 This certification by
the administration is done through a statement of compliance in the credentials
(licenses, certificates of documentation, etc.) that are issued to merchant
mariners.
The MARPOL Convention. The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships “is the main international convention covering prevention
of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental
causes.”52 It antedates UNCLOS, being a combination of two treaties adopted in
1973 and 1978, respectively. The convention contains five technical annexes; a
sixth annex was adopted via a protocol of 1997. These annexes prescribe, in sig-
nificant detail, standards to minimize or prevent pollution from ships, whether
from accidental discharges or routine ship operations. Adherence to annex I
(“Prevention of Oil Pollution”) and annex II (“Prevention of Pollution by Nox-
ious Liquid Substances in Bulk”) is mandatory for all MARPOL signatory states;
compliance with the remaining annexes, III–VI (respectively, “Prevention of
Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form,” “Preven-
tion of Pollution of the Sea by Sewage,” “Prevention of Pollution from Garbage,”
and “Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships”) is discretionary. One hundred
fifty nations, representing 99.14 percent of global shipping tonnage, have signed
on to annexes I and II; somewhat fewer, but in no case a number representing
less than 82 percent of global shipping tonnage, have signed the other annexes.53
As with other such conventions, signatory flag states bear the principal onus
of ensuring that their vessels comply with MARPOL’s requirements, signifying
their vessels’ compliance by issuing certificates. These include, as appropriate, an
International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate; an IMO Certificate
of Fitness for Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk; an IMO Certificate of Fit-
ness for Carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk; and an International Air Pol-
lution Prevention Certificate. Such certificates are required to be carried by
vessels of signatory flag states.
One other point of significance in relation to MARPOL is that whereas under
UNCLOS a coastal/port state may enact pollution legislation that applies to for-
eign vessels in waters subject to its jurisdiction, a state party to MARPOL must
make that convention’s provisions applicable to vessels, even foreign ones, in
waters subject to its jurisdiction.54 The United States has codified MARPOL in
its domestic law through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (Title 33,
United States Code, arts. 1901–15) and associated regulations.
The ISPS Code. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, a com-
prehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities,
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was developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and port facilities in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. It is implemented through
chapter XI-2, “Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security,” of the SOLAS
Convention. The code, which entered into force on 1 July 2004, has two parts,
one mandatory and one recommendatory. The United States, as a SOLAS signa-
tory, is bound by the ISPS Code, and has incorporated ISPS into its domestic
regulations in Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations, subchapter H.
ISPS prescribes complementary security measures to be taken both aboard
vessels and at port facilities. Contracting governments are required to conduct
security assessments of their port facilities and are responsible for ensuring that
shipping companies assess all vessels flying their flags. Each facility and vessel is
then required to create a security plan (Port Facility Security Plan or Ship Secu-
rity Plan) outlining the operational and physical security measures the facility
or ship will have in place during normal operations and in heightened security
circumstances. Every ship is required to carry an International Ship Security
Certificate indicating that it complies with the requirements of SOLAS chapter
XI-2 and part A (the mandatory part) of the ISPS Code.
{LINE-SPACE}
There are many more conventions that support the UNCLOS framework, some
that further explain and supplement the five discussed here. For example, chap-
ter VII of SOLAS, which makes mandatory the International Maritime Danger-
ous Goods Code, also variously refers to such supplementary doctrine as the
International Bulk Chemical Code, the International Gas Carrier Code, and the
International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel,
Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships.
These conventions—the five discussed and the others like them—do not ap-
ply to all vessels; in fact, each has complicated applicability provisions, involving
vessel type and tonnage.55 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the conventions de-
scribed above embody the most significant and comprehensive “other” law of
the sea, applicable to the vast majority of vessels involved in international com-
mercial service. Such vessels are the principal focus of port states, which desire to
minimize the deleterious safety, pollution, and security effects of such vessels for
their sovereign territories. Port states protect their vital interests in such areas by
an inspection and control regime known as “port-state control.”
PORT-STATE CONTROL
Under this regime a port state may take measures that include boardings and in-
spections, followed by control actions as necessary in response to any identified
discrepancies. Collectively, for each port state these measures exist within a
comprehensive framework called the “port-state control” (PSC) program. The
N O R R I S 8 9
NWC_2011SummerReview.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_2011SummerReview\NWC_2011SummerReview.vp
Tuesday, April 19, 2011 11:14:55 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 3, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/6
American PSC program, which is administered by the U.S. Coast Guard, will be
examined as representative of such programs worldwide.
The primary goal of the American PSC program is to eliminate substandard
vessels (those “whose hull, machinery, equipment, or operational safety is sub-
stantially below the minimum standards required by the relevant convention or
whose crew is not in conformance with the safe manning document”) from U.S.
waters.56 The first step is to board and inspect vessels for compliance with safety,
security, and environmental-protection standards. With thousands of foreign
vessels visiting American ports every year and inspection resources spread thin,
not every vessel can be boarded and inspected. Instead, the Coast Guard selects
vessels for boarding and inspection, by two methods: first, targeting specific ves-
sels likely not to be in compliance, as indicated by their scores on a targeting ma-
trix (discussed below); and second, randomly selecting other vessels, whatever
their targeting-matrix scores, just to keep everyone honest.
There are two targeting matrices, one for safety and one for security. The
safety matrix—officially called the “Safety and Environmental Protection Com-
pliance Targeting Matrix”—looks at five aspects of a vessel and assigns points
based on its demonstrated performance with respect to each.57 The categories
examined are ship management (who the owner, operator, or charterer is); flag
state; recognized organization (i.e., classification society); vessel history; and
particulars (type of vessel, age, etc.). With respect to point assignment, and us-
ing the flag-state category as an example, vessels flagged by a state that has a de-
tention ratio (discussed later) two or more times the average of all flag states will
be assigned seven points; if the flag state has a detention ratio above the average
but less than twice the average, the vessel is assigned two points; otherwise its
score in the “flag state” category is zero.58 Vessels assigned seventeen or more
points by the overall targeting matrix, that have been involved in marine casual-
ties that may have affected seaworthiness, that Coast Guard Captains of the Port
determine to be potential hazards to the port or the environment, or whose clas-
sification societies have detention ratios of 2 percent or more are all deemed
“Priority I” vessels and will be boarded.59 Vessels that receive seven to sixteen
points on the matrix are “Priority II,” and those that score six points or lower are
considered nonpriority vessels. Priority II vessels may be boarded as resources
permit; any non–Priority I vessel may be selected for examination by the PSC
random-selection process but will typically otherwise not be examined.60
The system is virtually identical on the security side, though the features ex-
amined in the security matrix—officially, the “ISPS/MTSA Security Compli-
ance Targeting Matrix”—are somewhat different.61 The ship-management and
flag-state categories examine the same features, though the point assignments
are somewhat different. “Recognized organization” in this case looks not at
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classification societies but at recognized security organizations (that is, RSOs).
The other two categories are the vessel’s security-compliance history and its past
ports of call. Vessels that score seventeen points or higher, that have had more
than three RSO-related control actions in the last twelve months, that have been
denied entry to or expelled from a port for ISPS-related reasons in the past
twelve months, or whose last five ports of call include any listed in the Federal
Register as not compliant with the ISPS Code are considered “ISPS I” vessels and
are to be examined while still at sea.62 “ISPS II” vessels (with scores between
seven and sixteen points or having new owners or flag states since the last ISPS
exam) are examined in port. “ISPS III” vessels are usually not subject to security
examinations, unless selected randomly.63
Once aboard a foreign vessel, PSC inspectors examine its documents for the
necessary certificates of compliance with safety/environmental and security re-
quirements. The international conventions permit officials of the coastal/port
state not only to examine the certificates supplied but to determine their valid-
ity.64 For example, the inspectors may require crew members to conduct fire-
fighting drills to demonstrate that they are in fact trained in that evolution, as
the Safety Management Certificate attests; to lower and raise a lifeboat to ensure
that the davit works properly and that the crew knows how to operate it; or to
demonstrate the operation of pollution-prevention equipment, such as the
oily-water separator (or OWS, a device that removes oil from a ship’s bilgewater
so the cleansed bilgewater can be discharged overboard).
If, as a result of the inspection, the PSC inspector determines there are “clear
grounds” to believe that the vessel has security violations or only a marginal level
of safety, the coastal/port state is authorized to impose control measures. The
“clear grounds” standard differs, depending on the nature of the problem. Any
security deficiency, regardless of nature, is sufficient.65 With respect to safety or
environmental issues, the deficiency has to pose a significant impact to the crew,
vessel, port, or environment.66
If clear grounds do exist, the possible control measures include, in decreasing
order of severity:
• Denial of entry, or expulsion
• Detainment67
• Captain of the Port order68
• Customs hold69
• Restrictions of operation/vessel movement
• Delay
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• Comprehensive security inspection70
• Letter of deviation71
• Flag-state notification
• Lesser administrative/corrective measures.
Enforcement measures available to port states include judicial civil-penalty pro-
ceedings for major noncriminal violations, repeat violations, or minor viola-
tions not corrected before the vessel returns to an American port; administrative
civil penalties for lesser violations; or letters of warning. Also, of course, as dis-
cussed in the following section, criminal prosecution is possible in the most
egregious cases.
SOME STATISTICS AND A CRITICAL ANALYSIS THEREOF
The United States publishes PSC statistics annually. According to the 2009 re-
port, in that year
a total of 8,557 individual vessels, from 86 different Flag Administrations [i.e., flag
states], made 75,902 port calls to the United States. The Coast Guard conducted
9,657 SOLAS safety exams, and 8,725 ISPS exams on these vessels. The total number
of ships detained in 2009 for environmental protection and safety related deficiencies
decreased [from the previous year] from 176 to 162. The total number of ships de-
tained in 2009 for security related deficiencies decreased from 27 to 18. During calen-
dar year 2009, we saw a drop in nearly all of the key tracking factors, likely owing to
the downturn of world economic conditions.72
The report tracks statistics from previous years in three-year groups. For the
three-year window ending in 1997, 6.64 percent of PSC inspections resulted in
vessel detentions for safety and environmental reasons. During the three years
ending in 2009, that ratio dropped to 1.92 percent. For security inspections the
statistics do not reach as far back, as the ISPS convention is of relatively recent
origin. Nonetheless, the 2009 report indicates that the three-year ISPS control-
action ratio has steadily declined, from 0.89 percent for the period ending in
2005 to 0.34 percent for the three years ending in 2009.73
These statistics appear to indicate that flag states are taking seriously their re-
sponsibilities under the “other” law of the sea, which would obviously be a posi-
tive development. However, there are some grounds for skepticism. First of all,
these are statistics for vessels arriving in U.S. ports. The United States has been
very aggressive in the administration of its PSC program—in fact, in the eyes of
some, too aggressive.74 Whatever the truth of the latter assertion, the mere per-
ception by operators of substandard vessels that their ships might be more strin-
gently examined in the United States than in other nations’ ports, with expensive
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delays if detained, may make such operators reluctant to send them here. In
short, positive safety and security statistics in the United States do not necessar-
ily mean that vessels are everywhere becoming more compliant; it just may
mean that problem vessels are going elsewhere.
Second, the numbers, while encouraging, suggest a compliance plateau in re-
cent years, if not a marginal decrease. The three-year average detention ratios
(percentages) for environmental and safety noncompliance for the periods be-
tween 1997 and 2009 are as follows: in 1997, 6.64; in 1998, 6.02; in 1999, 5.08; in
2000, 3.55; in 2001, 2.69; in 2002, 2.40; in 2003, 2.22; in 2004, 2.30; in 2005, 2.00;
in 2006, 1.78; in 2007, 1.60; in 2008, 1.75; and in 2009, 1.92.75 As these statistics
indicate, performance improved dramatically between 1997 and 2001 and only
incrementally after that. In fact, in recent years there has been a slight decline in
compliance. While the overall numbers are much improved in the past decade,
the statistics appear to show that, for cost reasons or otherwise, a compliance
ceiling has been reached, upon which it may prove hard to improve.
Finally, there is the valid criticism that the PSC inspections largely focus on
documents issued by the flag state (IOPP Certificates, etc.), paperwork that may
not truly reflect the material or security conditions aboard the vessel—that may
even, as one author has put it, be “used as a façade behind which groups or com-
panies can do whatever they please.”76 A recent case in the United States demon-
strates that such disconnects between documentary certification and actual
vessel conditions can and do occur. In United States v. Hugo Pena (et al.), a vessel
surveyor working for Universal Bureau Shipping (a recognized classification soci-
ety) and acting on behalf of the government of Panama issued the Panamanian-
flagged vessel Island Express I an IOPP Certificate on 15 April 2010.77 This certifi-
cate attested that the vessel’s pollution-prevention equipment, including its
oily-water separator, was fully operable. On 4 May, nineteen days later, American
PSC inspectors boarded the vessel and discovered that its OWS was in fact out of
commission. Subsequent investigation revealed that the class surveyor, a Mr.
Pena, had known the OWS was not operable on 15 April but had issued the IOPP
Certificate anyway. This was a violation of MARPOL and U.S. law, and it resulted
in his felony prosecution and conviction in U.S. court—the first-ever MARPOL
conviction in an American court of a class inspector for issuing fraudulent
certificates.
Notwithstanding these potential grounds for criticism, it seems that the
safety, security, and environmental protection regimes beyond UNCLOS can be,
and have been, effective. Anecdotally, despite the construction and operation of
supertankers and the increasing quantities of petroleum products being
shipped worldwide, spectacular vessel breakups and spills have not occurred in
recent years in the numbers that the world experienced even a few decades
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ago—Amoco Cadiz, Torrey Canyon, Exxon Valdez. Industry statistics back up
this impression. The average annual number of significant oil spills (over seven
hundred tons) from tankers in the 1970s was 25.4; in the 1980s, 9.3; in the 1990s,
7.9; and from 2000 to 2009, 3.3.78 The amount of cargo being shipped on the
world’s oceans is indeed vast and increasing—approximately thirty-three tril-
lion ton-miles in 2009, up from approximately twenty-three trillion ton-miles
in 2000.79 Nonetheless, total ship losses of vessels five hundred gross tons and
above have been cut nearly in half during the same period—from nearly 150 in
2000 to fewer than seventy-five in 2009.80
{LINE-SPACE}
There are many multilateral treaties that fill in the UNCLOS framework. These
instruments are widely accepted and implemented, and they promote order and
the free flow of commerce by prescribing universal standards for vessel con-
struction, operation, and management, for the training and qualification of
mariners, and the like. In accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, they assign compliance responsibility to flag states. How-
ever, in the spirit of “trust but verify,” they contain real enforcement mecha-
nisms that enable coastal and port states to safeguard their vital interests, even in
the face of occasionally lackadaisical flag-state oversight. Taken together, this
“other” law of the sea serves a valuable purpose, the promotion of vessel safety
and security and environmental stewardship. Statistics suggest that it is achiev-
ing its goals.
NOTE S
1. Quotation from statement of Secretary-
General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar upon signing
UNCLOS in 1982.
2. It is widely acknowledged that the War of
1812 was caused in large part by American
resentment of England’s practice of stopping
U.S. vessels on the high seas and “impress-
ing” sailors from those vessels into British na-
val service. More recently, a dispute between
Spain and Canada in 1995 over the turbot
fishery (known as the “Turbot War”) in the
North Atlantic threatened to devolve into
warfare when both nations deployed warships
to the disputed area.
3. UNCLOS adopts in large part, and builds
upon, maritime zone schemes that were less
comprehensively codified in earlier
international conventions, such as the 1958
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
4. A nation’s baseline is typically the low-water
line on its shores; however, UNCLOS con-
tains rules in part II (Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone) that govern establishment of a
baseline when facing irregular shoreline fea-
tures (bays, low tide elevations, etc.).
5. UNCLOS, arts. 2 and 3.
6. “International waters” is not a term of art un-
der UNCLOS, but it is commonly used to de-
scribe the waters beyond the sovereign waters
of the world’s territorial seas.
7. UNCLOS, art. 33.
8. Ibid., art. 57.
9. Ibid., art. 86.
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10. Ibid., art. 91.
11. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373
(11th Cir. 1982).
12. For example, 14 United States Code (hereafter
USC) § 89 authorizes designated Coast
Guard officials to go on board, at any time,
any vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; to address inquiries to those
on board, examine ship’s documents and pa-
pers, and examine, inspect, and search the
vessel; to arrest and seize as warranted; and to
use all necessary force to compel compliance
with orders.
13. UNCLOS, art. 94.
14. Ibid.
15. A flag state may, and typically does, contract
with a classification society (discussed in the
following section of this article) to assist it in
highly technical matters related to vessel de-
sign, construction, and maintenance.
16. Nations are free to enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements that modify
UNCLOS’s general principles. The conven-
tions comprising the “other” law of the sea
discussed later in this article are perfect ex-
amples of such agreements.
17. Jurisdiction over vessels includes jurisdiction
over persons aboard, as well as (often) vessel
owners, managers, agents, etc. It is important
to note that jurisdiction may not be exercised
against warships and other government ves-
sels in noncommercial service. UNCLOS,
arts. 32, 95, and 96.
18. Ibid., art. 87.
19. Myres McDougal and William Burke, The
Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary
International Law of the Sea (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), p. 869.
20. Those exceptions include universal crimes
(e.g., piracy); flag-state consent, either stand-
ing or ad hoc; hot pursuit; constructive pres-
ence; right of visit; master consent; and,
conceivably, jurisdiction pursuant to a UN
Security Council resolution.
21. It should be noted that although a flag state
retains full jurisdiction over its vessels wher-
ever they are, the reality is that the flag state
will be unable to exercise its jurisdictional
rights over a vessel in the territorial waters of
another state without the consent of that
state to enter those waters and do so.
22. UNCLOS, art. 56(1).
23. Ibid., art. 73.
24. Ibid., arts. 58(1) and (2).
25. Ibid., art. 33.
26. Ibid., arts. 21(1) and 211.
27. Ibid., art. 21(2).
28. Ibid., arts. 24(1)(a), 211(4).
29. Ibid., arts. 17–19. The limited exception to
the “continuous and expeditious” passage re-
quirement is that stopping and anchoring is
permitted if it is an incident of ordinary navi-
gation; it is made necessary by some life-
threatening distress aboard the vessel; or it is
incident to a vessel’s rendering assistance to
another vessel or aircraft in distress.
30. U.S. Navy Dept. and U.S. Transportation
Dept., The Commander’s Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Pub-
lication 1-14M (Washington, D.C.: 2010
rev.), sec. 3.2.2. For example, the distressed
vessel or would-be rescuer would not be sub-
ject to the coastal state’s customs, notice of
entry, or other laws that regulate the means
and manner by which vessels may enter terri-
torial waters. The distressed vessel or would-
be rescuer, however, is not entitled to blanket
immunity from coastal-state enforcement of
its other (non–condition of entry) domestic
laws.
31. UNCLOS, art. 27(5).
32. Ibid., art. 27(1).
33. Non-innocent passage would include linger-
ing, loitering, or engaging in an activity that
is prejudicial to the peace, good order, or se-
curity of the coastal state. UNCLOS, art. 19,
contains a list (in the U.S. view, an exclusive
list) of activities that are per se prejudicial to
the coastal state’s peace, good order, or secu-
rity and that are thus inconsistent with
innocent passage.
34. As in the territorial sea, a port state may, as a
matter of international comity, decline to ex-
ercise its enforcement jurisdiction over a for-
eign vessel in its internal waters if a crime or
incident aboard the vessel does not disturb
the “peace of the port” and instead “hand
off” disposition of the matter to the flag state.
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But see note 21 concerning a flag state’s abil-
ity to take enforcement action while its vessel
is in the territorial waters of another nation.
35. UNCLOS, art. 27(2).
36. Ibid., art. 25(2).
37. Ibid., art. 21(1).
38. Ibid., art. 21(2).
39. R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of
the Sea, 3rd ed. (Dover, N.H.: Manchester
Univ. Press 1999), p. 23.
40. IMO: International Maritime Organization,
www.imo.org/.
41. “Classification Societies: What, Why and
How?” International Association of Classifica-
tion Societies, www.iacs.org.uk/. IMO Resolu-
tion A.739(18) prescribes minimum
performance standards for classification
societies.
42. ISPS Code, B/4.3.
43. See, generally, Anna Mihneva-Natova, The
Relationship between United Nations Conven-
tion of the Sea and the IMO Conventions (New
York: United Nations and Nippon Founda-
tion of Japan, [2005]), available at www.un
.org/.
44. There have been many less comprehensive
amendments and additional protocols since
then.
45. “Status of Conventions Summary,” IMO: In-
ternational Maritime Organization, www.imo
.org/.
46. “International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,” IMO: Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, www.imo.org/.
47. Adopted through IMO Resolution A.741(18).
48. A “Safety Management System” is a struc-
tured and documented system enabling com-
pany personnel to implement effectively
the company’s safety and environmental-
protection policy. ISM Code, sec. 1.1.4.
49. ISM Code, sec. 1.4.
50. See note 45 above.
51. This reflects the reality that in the global
shipping world, vessels flagged in one state
are frequently crewed by mariners from one
or more other states.
52. “International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),” IMO:
International Maritime Organization, www
.imo.org/.
53. “Status of Conventions Summary.”
54. MARPOL, art. 4(2).
55. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., “Coast Guard
Port State Control Targeting and Examina-
tion Policy for Vessel Security and Safety,”
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
[hereafter NVIC] 06-03, Commandant
United States Coast Guard Publication [here-
after COMDTPUB] P16700.4, change 2
(Washington, D.C.: 27 March 2007), encl. 4,
table 4.
56. Ibid., encl. 4, p. 1.
57. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States: Annual Report
2009 (Washington, D.C.: 2009), p. 8.
58. Ibid.
59. Each U.S. port has a designated federal Cap-
tain of the Port (COTP), who is the senior
Coast Guard officer with responsibility for
enforcing, within that port, “port safety and
security and marine environmental protec-
tion regulations, including, without limita-
tion, regulations for the protection and
security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront
facilities; anchorages; security zones; safety
zones; regulated navigation areas; deepwater
ports; water pollution; and ports and water-
ways safety” (Code of Federal Regulations, Ti-
tle 33 [hereafter 33 CFR], § 1.01-30).
60. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States, p. 8.
61. Ibid., p. 18. The MTSA, or Maritime Trans-
portation and Security Act, is the U.S. law
that implements ISPS domestically. MTSA is
codified at 46 USC § 70101 et seq.
62. U.S. Homeland Security Dept., Port State
Control in the United States. For the Federal
Register, see www.federalregister.gov/.
63. Ibid.
64. See, for example, SOLAS, chap. I, regulation
19, and chap. XI-2, regulation 9 (with respect
to ISPS verification); also MARPOL, art. 5(2).
65. NVIC 06-03, encl. 4 note l, p. 5.
66. Ibid.
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67. A “detention” is a significant control action
that triggers, among other things, notification
of the vessel’s flag state and of the classifica-
tion society or recognized organization that
issued the certificates relating to the subject
of the detention; see U.S. Homeland Security
Dept., “Port State Control Guidelines for the
Enforcement of Management for the Safe
Operation of Ships (ISM Code),” NVIC
04-05, COMDTPUB P16700.4 (Washington,
D.C.: 1 August 2005), p. 9. NVIC 06-03, encl.
4, app. A provides examples of detainable de-
ficiencies for both safety and security.
68. 33 CFR § 160.111 grants the COTP authority
to order a vessel to anchor or to operate in
the manner directed when, inter alia, he or
she has reasonable cause to believe that the
vessel is not in compliance with any law, reg-
ulation, or treaty.
69. 46 USC § 60105 requires foreign vessels to
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